曼哈顿政策研究所-改革美联储的治理以实现更好的货币效果(英)-2024.3.docx

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1、Ill/March2024ReportReformtheFederalReserve,sGovernancetoDeliverBetterMonetaryOutcomesDanielKatzAdjunctFellowManhattanInstituteStephenMiranAdjunctFellowManhattanInstituteAboutUsTheManhattanInstituteisathinktankwhosemissionistodevelopanddisseminatenewideasthatfostergreatereconomicchoiceandindividualre

2、sponsibility.ExecutiveSummaryCentralbankindependenceiswidelyregardedasanessentialelementofeffectiveeconomicstewardship.Yetpureindependenceisincompatiblewithademocraticsystem.Therefore,anyparticularexampleofcentralbankindependenceWithinademocraticSyStemnecessarilyfeaturesaseriesofjudgmentsaboutthecen

3、tralbanksinstitutionaldesign.Theoverallgoalofthisdesignisdeliveringtheenomicbenefitsofacentralbankthatisinsulatedfromtheday-to-daypoliticalprocesswhilemaintainingalevelofaccountabilitythatademocraticsocietymustdemand.TheFederalReserve,srecordinrecentyearsraisesquestionsaboutwhetherithasbeenoperating

4、inlinewiththebestpracticesofcentralbankindependence.TheFed,suniquestructure,includingremovalprotections,lengthyterms,andprivateownershipoftheReserveBanksystem,isdesignedtoensuretheindependenceofmonetarypolicy.However,ouranalysisshowsthatinpractice,theFed,scurrentgovernancehasfacilitatedgroupthinktha

5、thasledtosignificantmonetary-policyerrorswhileallowingtheFedtheflexibilitytounwiselyexpanditsremitintoinherentlypoliticalareassuchascreditrationingandbankingregulation.Thisreportarguesthatimportantbenefitsflowfromacentralbankthatcanconductmonetarypolicyfreefromshort-termpoliticalpressuresandthattoen

6、abletheFedtodoso,itsgovernanceshouldbeoverhauled.WeproposeaseriesofreformsaimedatrecalibratingtheFed,sgovernancetoensurethatitremainsinsulatedfromday-to-daypoliticswhileenhancingitsaccountabilityanddemocraticlegitimacy.TheproposedreformsincluderestructuringthetermsofFedboardmembersandReSerVeBanklead

7、ers;alteringthestructureoftheFederalOpenMarketCommittee(FOMC)toenhancetherelativepoweroftheReserveBanks;reformingtheReserveBanksystemtoprovidemoreaccountabilityatthestatelevel;andcordoningoffnonmonetarj,-policyfunctionssuchasbankregulationandcrisisresponsefromtheFOMC.Thesechangesaredesignedtocreateb

8、etterincentivestoallowtheFOMCtoconductmonetarypolicyfreefromshort-termpoliticalconsiderations,partlybyintroducingwhatwecall“monetaryfederalismzztochecktheabilityoftheU.S.presidenttocompletelydominatethebalanceofpowerontheFOMC.ThesechangesalsoensurethattheFedcanoperatewiththenecessaryindependencetose

9、teffectivemonetarypolicywhilebeingaccountabletodemocraticinstitutions.IntroductionCentralbankindependencehaslongbeenconsideredanessentialelementforsuccessfulmonetarypolicy.Butcentralbanksarecreationsofpoliticalexigency,andpureindependenceexistsonlyintextbks.Thatshibbolethslike“independence“generally

10、deliversuperiorenomicoutcomesistakenasaxiomaticbytheenomicsandpolicycommunities.Inpractice,centralbankindependenceisintendedtoallowthepursuitoflong-termgoalsdespiteshort-termpoliticalvicissitudes,butitcanalsobestowpowerwithoutaccountability.ButrecentmisstepsattheFederalReservedemonstratethattheFedis

11、fallingshortoftheseaims,withattendantenomicconsequences.1.arge-scaleassetpurchasesfollowingthe2008-09financialcrisisdistortedtheallocationofcreditacrosstheeconomy.Theattempttotightenpolicyin2018hadtobereversedquickly.TheFed,sswiftresponsetoCovid-19isoftenlauded,butitsunilateraltransitiontoaframework

12、whereitexplicitlysoughttoovershtitsinflationtarget/itsexcessivemonetaryaccommodation,anditsdismissalofincipientinflationas“transitory?contributedtotwoyearsofdecliningrealincomes3andthehighestinflationinfourdecades.4Aclusterofregionalbanksfailedwhiletheirsupervisorswereasleepatthewheel,largelybecause

13、thebankstookinterest-raterisksthatwerereasonablebasedontheirsupervisorsforwardguidanceatoolusedbythecentralbanktoinfluencemarketexpectationsoffutureinterestrates.5Tliischeckeredrecordinvitesthequestion:Whyisasupposedly“independent“centralbankmakingsuchobviouserrors?Thesefailuresareduelargelytotheero

14、sionofthekeyelementsthattraditionallyunderpinnedcentralbankindependence.ScrutinyofFedrhetoricandactionsmakesitclearthattheFedhasmovedbeyonditstraditionalnarrow,technocraticroleandinsteadhaspursuedamuchmoreexpansivemonetaryandregulatoryagendathatismoreconsistentwithanexplicitlypoliticalinstitution.Th

15、eFed,smandatehasexpandedtoincludeinherentlypoliticalactivitiessuchascreditallocation,theselectionofeconomicwinnersandlosers,andbanksupervision.Furthermore,theFedhasitselfvoluntarilywadedintohighlypoliticaldebates,suchasurgingincreasedfiscalstimulus6aheadofapresidentialelectionandinrporatingenvironme

16、ntalnsiderations7intothefinancialregulatorj,framework.1.eadershipthatWaStraditionallyregardedastechnocratichasbeenreplacedwithhighlyqualified,buthighlypolitical,personnelwhomovefreelybetweentheWhiteHouseandtheEcclesBuilding.Worstofall,policyacuntabilityhasbeenabsent.Currentgovernancestructuresandpracticeslacknegativefeedbackchannels,soprpolicydecisionsdonotnecessaril

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