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1、Ill/March2024ReportReformtheFederalReserve,sGovernancetoDeliverBetterMonetaryOutcomesDanielKatzAdjunctFellowManhattanInstituteStephenMiranAdjunctFellowManhattanInstituteAboutUsTheManhattanInstituteisathinktankwhosemissionistodevelopanddisseminatenewideasthatfostergreatereconomicchoiceandindividualre
2、sponsibility.ExecutiveSummaryCentralbankindependenceiswidelyregardedasanessentialelementofeffectiveeconomicstewardship.Yetpureindependenceisincompatiblewithademocraticsystem.Therefore,anyparticularexampleofcentralbankindependenceWithinademocraticSyStemnecessarilyfeaturesaseriesofjudgmentsaboutthecen
3、tralbanksinstitutionaldesign.Theoverallgoalofthisdesignisdeliveringtheenomicbenefitsofacentralbankthatisinsulatedfromtheday-to-daypoliticalprocesswhilemaintainingalevelofaccountabilitythatademocraticsocietymustdemand.TheFederalReserve,srecordinrecentyearsraisesquestionsaboutwhetherithasbeenoperating
4、inlinewiththebestpracticesofcentralbankindependence.TheFed,suniquestructure,includingremovalprotections,lengthyterms,andprivateownershipoftheReserveBanksystem,isdesignedtoensuretheindependenceofmonetarypolicy.However,ouranalysisshowsthatinpractice,theFed,scurrentgovernancehasfacilitatedgroupthinktha
5、thasledtosignificantmonetary-policyerrorswhileallowingtheFedtheflexibilitytounwiselyexpanditsremitintoinherentlypoliticalareassuchascreditrationingandbankingregulation.Thisreportarguesthatimportantbenefitsflowfromacentralbankthatcanconductmonetarypolicyfreefromshort-termpoliticalpressuresandthattoen
6、abletheFedtodoso,itsgovernanceshouldbeoverhauled.WeproposeaseriesofreformsaimedatrecalibratingtheFed,sgovernancetoensurethatitremainsinsulatedfromday-to-daypoliticswhileenhancingitsaccountabilityanddemocraticlegitimacy.TheproposedreformsincluderestructuringthetermsofFedboardmembersandReSerVeBanklead
7、ers;alteringthestructureoftheFederalOpenMarketCommittee(FOMC)toenhancetherelativepoweroftheReserveBanks;reformingtheReserveBanksystemtoprovidemoreaccountabilityatthestatelevel;andcordoningoffnonmonetarj,-policyfunctionssuchasbankregulationandcrisisresponsefromtheFOMC.Thesechangesaredesignedtocreateb
8、etterincentivestoallowtheFOMCtoconductmonetarypolicyfreefromshort-termpoliticalconsiderations,partlybyintroducingwhatwecall“monetaryfederalismzztochecktheabilityoftheU.S.presidenttocompletelydominatethebalanceofpowerontheFOMC.ThesechangesalsoensurethattheFedcanoperatewiththenecessaryindependencetose
9、teffectivemonetarypolicywhilebeingaccountabletodemocraticinstitutions.IntroductionCentralbankindependencehaslongbeenconsideredanessentialelementforsuccessfulmonetarypolicy.Butcentralbanksarecreationsofpoliticalexigency,andpureindependenceexistsonlyintextbks.Thatshibbolethslike“independence“generally
10、deliversuperiorenomicoutcomesistakenasaxiomaticbytheenomicsandpolicycommunities.Inpractice,centralbankindependenceisintendedtoallowthepursuitoflong-termgoalsdespiteshort-termpoliticalvicissitudes,butitcanalsobestowpowerwithoutaccountability.ButrecentmisstepsattheFederalReservedemonstratethattheFedis
11、fallingshortoftheseaims,withattendantenomicconsequences.1.arge-scaleassetpurchasesfollowingthe2008-09financialcrisisdistortedtheallocationofcreditacrosstheeconomy.Theattempttotightenpolicyin2018hadtobereversedquickly.TheFed,sswiftresponsetoCovid-19isoftenlauded,butitsunilateraltransitiontoaframework
12、whereitexplicitlysoughttoovershtitsinflationtarget/itsexcessivemonetaryaccommodation,anditsdismissalofincipientinflationas“transitory?contributedtotwoyearsofdecliningrealincomes3andthehighestinflationinfourdecades.4Aclusterofregionalbanksfailedwhiletheirsupervisorswereasleepatthewheel,largelybecause
13、thebankstookinterest-raterisksthatwerereasonablebasedontheirsupervisorsforwardguidanceatoolusedbythecentralbanktoinfluencemarketexpectationsoffutureinterestrates.5Tliischeckeredrecordinvitesthequestion：Whyisasupposedly“independent“centralbankmakingsuchobviouserrors?Thesefailuresareduelargelytotheero
14、sionofthekeyelementsthattraditionallyunderpinnedcentralbankindependence.ScrutinyofFedrhetoricandactionsmakesitclearthattheFedhasmovedbeyonditstraditionalnarrow,technocraticroleandinsteadhaspursuedamuchmoreexpansivemonetaryandregulatoryagendathatismoreconsistentwithanexplicitlypoliticalinstitution.Th
15、eFed,smandatehasexpandedtoincludeinherentlypoliticalactivitiessuchascreditallocation,theselectionofeconomicwinnersandlosers,andbanksupervision.Furthermore,theFedhasitselfvoluntarilywadedintohighlypoliticaldebates,suchasurgingincreasedfiscalstimulus6aheadofapresidentialelectionandinrporatingenvironme
16、ntalnsiderations7intothefinancialregulatorj,framework.1.eadershipthatWaStraditionallyregardedastechnocratichasbeenreplacedwithhighlyqualified,buthighlypolitical,personnelwhomovefreelybetweentheWhiteHouseandtheEcclesBuilding.Worstofall,policyacuntabilityhasbeenabsent.Currentgovernancestructuresandpracticeslacknegativefeedbackchannels,soprpolicydecisionsdonotnecessaril
