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1、Inter-industryandintra-industryswitchingassourcesofproductivitygrowth:structuralchangeofFinland,sICTindustriesNataliaKuosmanenG Timo KUoSmanen timo.kuosmanenutu.fl ETLA Economic Research, Helsinki, Finland Department of Economics, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku, Turku, FinlandPublish
2、ed online: 21 NCVemher 2023TimoKuosmanen?Accepted:2November2023TheAuthor(s)2023AbstractStructuralchangei$animportantdriverofproductivitygrowthattheaggregatelevel.WhilepreviousPrOdUCIiVitydecompositionsaccountforthecontributionsofmarketentryandexit,theyoverlookcontinuingfirmsthatswitchfromoneindustry
3、toanother.Wedevelopanimprovedproductivitydecompositionthataccountsforbothintra-industryandinterindustryswitching,isapplicabletobothstaticandinter-temporalsettings,andensuresconsistentaggregationoffirm-levelproductivitytotheindustrylevel.TheproposeddecompositionisappliedtoFinlandsinformationandcommun
4、icationtechnology(ICT)industryinthefirsttwodecadesofthe21stcentury.ThisindustryexperiencedmajorstructuralchangesduetotherapiddownfallofNokia,theworldslargestmobilephonemanufactureratthebeginningofourstudyperiod.Ourresultsrevealthatthesharpdeclineoflaborproductivitywasassociatedwithstructuralchanges,
5、whereasthesurvivingfirmsthatcontinuedinthesameindustrymanagedtoimprovetheirproductivity.Ourresultsindicatethatindustryswitchingcandampenorenhancetheproductivityimpactsofstructuralchange,especiallyduringtimesofcrisisandrecession.KeywordsEntryandexitLaborproductivity-ProductswitchingReallocationofreso
6、urcesJELclassificationD24L160471IntroductionSchumpeter(1939)coinedthetermwcreativedestructiontodescribehowmarketcompetitionleadstothecontinuousreplacementofinefficientproducerswithmoreproductiveones.Healsonotedthatduringrecessions,theleastproductiveandleastinnovativeunitsaremorelikelytobescrapped,wh
7、ichcanhelptoincreaseproductivityandfosternewgrowth.However,thetraditionalapproachofmeasuringproductivitygrowthusingbalancedpaneldataofcontinuingfirmsignorestheimpactofstructuralchangethroughentryandexitonproductivitygrowth(TheuseofbalancedpanelsoffirmsinMalmquistproductivitydecompositionsremainscomm
8、ontoday,withrecentexamplesincludingBansaletal.(2022),Laporseketal.(2022),andLiandGuan(2022),amongothers).Bailyetal.(1992)andGrilichesandRegev(1995)werethefirsttointroducestructuralchangedecompositionsofproductivitygrowththatconsiderednotonlythecontinuingfirmsbutalsothecontributionsoffirmentryandexit
9、.FollowingOlleyandPakes(1996),anotherlineofstudiesdistinguishesthecontributionofresourcereallocationacrossfirms,whichisalsorelatedtocreativedestruction.CompetitionfavorsHighproductivityfirms,whichtendtogrowlargerthanIowproductivityfirms.NotethatthemarketshareofaIowproductivityfirmmayinitiallyshrinka
10、ndeventuallyreachzero,resultinginamarketexit.Severalsubsequentstudies,suchasMaliranta(2003),BockermanandMaliranta(2(X)7),D沁WertandFox(20()9),HyytinenandMaliranta(2013),Holm(2014),MelitzandPolanec(2015),andMalirantaandMiiattanen(2015)haveextendedtheOlley-Pakesproductivitydecompositiontoincorporateent
11、ryandexit.Inpreviousproductivitydecompositionscitedabove,firmsareclassifiedintomutuallyexclusivegroupsofcontinuingfirms,exitingfirms,andnewentrants.ConventionaltheoreticalfoundationforthestructuralchangedecompositionsofproductivitytobeintroducedinSection3.Dynamicmodelsofoligopolythatincoratesunkentr
12、ycosts,stochastictechnologicalprogress,andendogenousexitdecision-makinghavegainedsignificantattentionintheliterature.Thesemodels,firstintroducedbyJovanovic(1982),Hopenhayn(1992),EricsonandPakes(1995),andOlleyandPakes(1996)(Forrecentdevelopments,seeAbbringetal.(2018)andreferencestherein),examinehowfi
13、rmsmaximizetheirexpectednetpresentvalueoffutureprofitsbycompetingwithincumbentfirmsandpotentialentrantsinthefuture.Theentryandexitdecisionsmadebyfirmsdependontheirperceptionsoffuturemarketstructures,whicharebasedoncurrentinformation.Thesedecisionsultimatelyshapethefuturemarketstructures.EricsonandPa
14、kes(1995)establishedaMarkovperfectNashequilibriuminwhichfirmsperceptionsofthedistributionoffuturemarketstructuresalignwiththeobjectivedistributionofmarketstructuresgeneratedbythefirmschoices.OHeyandPakes(1996)describetheendogenousexitruleimpliedbytheirdynamicoligopolymodelasfollows:uafirmcomparesthe
15、sell-offvalueofitsplanttotheexpecteddiscountedreturnsofstayinginbusiness.Ifthecurrentstatevariablesindicatecontinuinginoperationisnotworthwhile,thefirmclosesdowntheplant.(p.1273).Inotherwords,marketexitoccursasavoluntaryliquidationdecisionasthefirmupdatesitsperceptionsoffutureprofits.Inreality,marke
16、texitoftenoccursinvoluntarilythroughbankruptcy.MurtoandTervio(2014)addressthispossibilitybyintroducingamodelthatincludesforcedexitduetoliquidityconstraints.Inthismodel,firmsmaybeforcedtoexitthemarketduetoalackofliquidity,evenifitwouldstillbeprofitabletostayinbusiness.Therefore,thefirmmustoptimallymanageitscashreservestocopewiththeliquidityconstraint.Theyshowthattheequilibriumstateofthemarketmayresultineithertoomuchortoolittleexitdepen
