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1、INTERNATIONA1.MONETARYFUNDDidtheU.S.ReallyGrowOutofItsWorldWarIlDebt?JulienAcalinand1.aurenceBallWP/24/5IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(三)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(三)anddonotnecessarilyrepresentthe
2、viewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.WoRK-NGPAPER2024JANWP/24/52024InternationalMonetaryFundIMFWorkingPaperResearchDepartmentDidtheU.S.ReallyGrowOutofItsWorldWarIlDebt?PreparedbyJulienAcalinand1.aurenceBall*AuthorizedfordistributionbyPrachiMishraJanuary2024IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearch
3、inprogressbytheauthor(三)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheathor(三)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.ABSTRACT:ThefallintheU.S.publicdebt/GDPratiofrom106%in1946to23%in1974isoftenattributedtoh
4、ighratesofeconomicgrowth.Thispaperexaminestherolesofthreeotherfactors:primarybudgetsurpluses,surpriseinflation,andpeggedinterestratesbeforetheFed-TreasuryAccordof1951.Ourcentralresultisasimulationofthepaththatthedebt/GDPratiowouldhavefollowedwithprimarybudgetbalanceandwithoutthedistortionsinrealinte
5、restratescausedbysurpriseinflationandthepre-Accordpeg.Inthiscounterfactal,debt/GDPdeclinesonlyto74%in1974,not23%asinactualhistory.Moreover,theratiostartsrisingagainin1980andin2022itis84%.Thesefindingsimplythat,overthelast76years,onlyasmallamountofdebtreductionhasbeenachievedthroughgrowthratesthatexc
6、eedundistortedinterestrates.RECOMMENDEDCITATION:Acalin,Julienand1.aurenceBall(2024):DidtheU.S.ReallyGrowOutofitsWorldWarIlDebt?,IMFWorkingPaper.JE1.ClassificationNumbers:E31,E43,E65,H60,H63Keywords:U.S.PublicDebt;FinancialRepression;SurpriseInflation;r-gAuthor,sE-MailAddress:iacalinimf.orq:lballihu.
7、eduWearegratefultoGeorgeHallforhelpwiththedata.WethankFrancesBianchi,RuiEsteves,OlivierJeanne,N.GregoryMankiw,RicardoReis,andparticipantsintheJHUMacro-Financeseminar,theCEPRInternationalMacro-Historyonlineseminar,andtheDebtCon6Princetonconferenceforusefulcomments.WealsothankKyungWoongKohforoutstandi
8、ngresearchassistance.ContentsIntroduction1FactorsInfluencingtheDebt/GDPRatio3ConstructingCounterfactualPathsoftheDebt/GDPRatio6DataandMeasurement13Results19ComparisontoHallandSargent(2011)22Conclusions25References28Tables29Figures30Appendix341 IntroductionDoesahighlevelofnationaldebtimposeaburdenonf
9、uturegenerationswhomustpayitoff?Inrecentyears,economistssuchasBlanchard(2019)andFurmanandSummers(2020)havesuggestedthattheanswermaybeno,becauserg:therealinterestrateondebtisusuallybelowthegrowthrateoftheeconomy.Underthatcondition,thegovernmentcanrolloverthedebtandaccumulatinginterestwithoutraisingta
10、xes,andthedebt/GDPratiowillfallovertime.Becauseofthispossibility,agrowingnumberofeconomistsagreeWithBlanchardthatupublicdebtmayhavenofiscalcost.”ThisideahasdecreasedconcernaboutthehighcurrentlevelofU.S.debt.Thinkingonthisissuehasbeeninfluencedbyasalienthistoricalexperience:thedeclineintheU.S.debt/GD
11、PratioafterWorldWarI1.Payingforthewarincreasedthisratiofrom42%infiscalyear1941to106%in1946,butthenitstartedtofallandreachedatroughof23%infiscalyear1974.AsElmendorfandMankiw(1999)report,wanimportantfactorbehindthedramaticdropbetween1945and1975isthatthegrowthrateofGDPexceededtheinterestrateongovernmen
12、tdebtformostofthatperiod/5Krugman(2012)saysthatthe“debtfromWorldWarIIwasneverrepaidandjustbecameincreasinglyirrelevantastheU.S.economygrew.”Thisinterpretationofhistorylendscredencetotheideathatahighlevelofdebtshouldnotcausegreatconcern.However,otherresearchershavesuggestedreasonstoquestionthisinterp
13、retation.First,asdiscussedbyauthorssuchasHallandSargent(2011)andEichengreenandEsteves(2022),theU.S.actuallypaidoffpartoftheWorldWarIIdebtbyrunningprimarysurplusesbylevyingtaxesinexcessofcurrentgovernmentspendingovermuchoftheperiodwhenthedebt/GDPratiowasfalling.Second,asdiscussedbyauthorssuchasReinha
14、rtandSbrancia(2015),interestrateswerehelddownrelativetoeconomicgrowththroughpoliciesthatarenotlikelytobefeasibleand/ordesirableinthefuture.Thesepoliciesincludedepisodesoffinancialrepression,mostclearlytheFedpeggingofinterestratesatlowlevelsfrom1942to1951,whichwasaimedatdecreasingthecostofthewar.Inad
15、dition,ex-postrealinterestrateswerereducedbyunexpectedrisesininflationintheaftermathofthewarandlaterinthe1960sand1970s.Becauseofthesefactors,thepostwarexperiencedoesnotnecessarilysuggestthattheU.S.economynaturallygrowsoutofdebt.Thispaperseekstoexplainthepathofthedebt/GDPratiosinceits1946peakof106%.W
16、eestimatetheeffectsonthispathofthegovernmentsprimarysurpluses,theinterestratepegbefore1951,andsurpriseinflation.WethenderiveaCounterfactualpaththatthedebt/GDPratiowouldhavefollowedintheabsenceofthesefactors.ThisCounterfactualshowshowmuchtheratiowasreducedbygrowthratesinexcessofundistortedrealinterestratesratesthatarenotreducedbyeitherapegorsurpriseinflation.WefindthatthisCounterf
